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choice between an enlarged Serbia and a 
large Yugoslav state, Le Moal recognises 
a patient effort to keep balance between 
the allies, the Yugoslav Committee and 
the war events. He sees the outcome – the 
creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats 
and Slovenes on 1 December 1918 – as 
a success of Pašić’s politics because the 
post-war Yugoslav kingdom was based on 
pre-war Serbia’s nation-building tradition 
and on her military victories. 
In short, this is a book which under-
standingly but with measure and method 
portrays the road from “martyrdom to 
victory” travelled by a small country in the 
Great War. It will no doubt help allevi-
ate the lack of literature on the history of 
Serbia in 1914–18 in foreign languages.  
Jean-Paul Bled, François-Ferdinand d’autriCHe. Paris: Tallandier, 
2012, pp. 367.
Reviewed by Veljko Stanić*
If the name of Franz Ferdinand as the 
victim of the Sarajevo assassination on 
28 June 1914 has impressed itself on the 
collective memory of the Europeans, the 
same can hardly be said for the life of 
the heir-apparent. His life was cut short 
before he even got the chance to accede 
to the throne. Yet, his ambitions and ac-
tivities in almost twenty years he bore the 
title raise a number of questions of rel-
evance to understanding the last years of 
Austria-Hungary and international rela-
tions prior to 1914. Among the freshly re-
leased history books that re-examine the 
circumstances surrounding the outbreak 
of the First World War, stands out the 
biography of heir to the Habsburg throne 
penned by the French professor Jean-Paul 
Bled.
For such subject matter as Franz Fer-
dinand’s biography one can hardly hope to 
find a more competent historian. Emeri-
tus professor at the University of Paris-
Sorbonne (Paris IV), Jean-Paul Bled is 
a leading specialist in the history of the 
Habsburg Monarchy. A prolific writer of 
refined style, Bled is an expert on the his-
tory of political ideas, perhaps best known 
for his noted biographies of some of the 
central figures of Austrian and German 
history, to mention but Franz Joseph, 
Maria Theresa, Frederick the Great and 
Bismarck. A German edition of the biog-
raphy of Franz Ferdinand has been pub-
lished by the Böhlau Verlag. The author’s 
erudite knowledge accumulated over the 
years devoted to the historical study of 
the Habsburg Monarchy is so well known 
that it need no special mention, but it 
is worthy of note that this biography is 
based on a scrupulous analysis of Franz 
Ferdinand Fonds from the Haus-, Hof- 
und Staatsarchiv (HHStA) and the fonds 
of his Military Chancery deposited at the 
Kriegsarchiv in Vienna.
In order to clarify the main contri-
bution of this book, we shall sketch the 
portrait of Franz Ferdinand as it vibrantly 
and suggestively emerges from the au-
thor’s narrative.  We shall take a look at 
his political convictions and views on 
pursuing practical politics both in domes-
tic and in foreign affairs. The plans for a 
reorganisation of the Monarchy as a pos-
sible framework for the course Franz Fer-
dinand might have pursued in the event of 
his accession to the throne deserve special 
attention. Finally, we shall look at Franz 
Ferdinand’s stance on Austria-Hungary’s 
Balkan policy and, in particular, on her 
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to an end as a result of health problems, he 
was at the head of his Military Chancery, 
which would become an influential body 
in Austria-Hungary. In August 1913, 
Franz Ferdinand was appointed general 
inspector of the imperial and royal armed 
forces, which meant that he would be 
commander-in-chief of the Austro-Hun-
garian army in the event of war.    
His marriage to Sophie Chotek read-
ily emerges as one of the main elements 
for creating a picture of Franz Ferdinand’s 
life, not only because of the symbolism of 
their death together in 1914, but also be-
cause their deeper beliefs and life choices. 
The author paints the portrait of a dedi-
cated family man who pays a dear politi-
cal price for his love. A descendant of the 
old but lesser Czech nobility unworthy 
of a Habsburg, Sophie Chotek is a bone 
of content between the archduke and 
the emperor, inflicting even more lasting 
harm to their already cold relations. The 
outcome of this affair is the morganatic 
marriage of Franz Ferdinand and So-
phie, which excludes their children from 
the succession, and condemns Sophie to 
a lower rank at court and on public oc-
casions. The chapters on the couple’s ev-
eryday life, residences, personal passions, 
such as Franz Ferdinand’s passion for 
hunting, his care for cultural heritage and, 
conversely, less than enthusiastic attitude 
to modernism in art, convincingly con-
tribute to the comprehensiveness of the 
biographic and family picture.      
*
Franz Ferdinand’s political ideas betray, 
not without paradox and ambiguity, a 
“conservative reformer”. Bled explicitly 
points to the power of Ferdinand’s per-
sonal prejudices, lack of education and 
unpreparedness for the role of heir to 
the throne, which becomes particularly 
noticeable if he is compared to Franz 
Joseph’s son Rudolf. Like Rudolf, Franz 
Ferdinand is convinced that Austria-
conflict with Serbia in the years preceding 
the outbreak of the First World War.
*
The life Franz Ferdinand had lived until 
the death of crown prince Rudolf of Aus-
tria, son of Franz Joseph, at Mayerling in 
1889, can hardly be described as being 
unusual in any way. From then on, and 
officially from the death of Ferdinand’s 
father in 1896, everything changes. The 
impulsive archduke, often shadowed by a 
subdued feeling of injustice and discon-
tent, becomes an ambitious and impatient 
heir to the throne.  
In the analysis offered by this book, 
Franz Ferdinand’s family background 
seems quite important to understanding 
the overall picture. Born in 1863 to the 
emperor’s younger brother Karl Ludwig 
and Maria Annunziata von Neapel-Siz-
ilien, he was just one of many archdukes 
in the ruling House of Habsburg. His fa-
ther Karl Ludwig, devoted to the family 
and traditional values, was not engaged in 
affairs of state. The family’s pronounced 
Catholicism was not a Habsburg privi-
lege, but also a legacy of his mother’s 
lineage, through which Franz Ferdinand 
was a grandson of king Ferdinand II of 
the Two Sicilies, nicknamed “Re Bomba” 
for suppressing the 1848 revolutionary 
movement in his realm. After his moth-
er’s death, his father remarried to Marie 
Therese von Bragança, and the young 
archduke developed a close relationship 
with his stepmother. Although he had 
been subjected to a rigorous regime of 
study from an early age, serious gaps in 
his education would become obvious in 
his mature years, when he became heir to 
the throne, a role for which he had not 
been trained. As custom required, the 
young archduke embarked on a military 
career and at the age of fifteen was given 
the rank of sub-lieutenant. He served at 
garrisons in Enns, Prague and Oden-
bourg. Although his military career came 
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Hungary, as a multinational empire fac-
ing the challenge of political freedoms 
and national aspirations of its peoples, 
has serious problems which jeopardise its 
survival. For this reason he becomes an 
advocate of the Monarchy’s fundamental 
reorganisation. Unlike Rudolf ’s liberal-
ism, however, Franz Ferdinand reminds 
more of the age of Leopold I or the spirit 
of neo-absolutism in Austria. In his eyes, 
Austro-Hungarian dualism should make 
way to a strong unitary Austria. An au-
tocrat with little sympathy for a con-
stitutional system and political parties, 
Franz Ferdinand is a bitter opponent of 
liberalism. He is contemptuous of liber-
als, socialists, German nationalists, free-
masons and Jews alike, although his anti-
Semitism is of a traditional sort, free from 
the biological rooting and political conse-
quences encountered in his contemporary 
Georg von Schönerer or, subsequently, in 
Hitler. Still, his Roman Catholicism and 
his pronounced dislike of the Hungarian 
political factor in Austria-Hungary draw 
him nearer to the Christian socialists of 
Karl Lueger. In late 1906, Franz Ferdi-
nand resolutely opposes the introduction 
of universal suffrage in Cisleithania, and 
loses the battle, but he makes a u-turn and 
argues for the introduction of the very 
same right in Transleithania, calculated 
to erode and eliminate Hungarian hege-
mony in that part of the Monarchy.   
In the area of international relations, 
Franz Ferdinand is inclined to a policy of 
caution and avoidance of diplomatic cri-
ses and armed conflicts as potentially fatal 
for the Monarchy. He advocates a triple 
alliance of the European conservative 
monarchies: Austria-Hungary, Germany 
and Russia, believing that the place in the 
alliance of the Central powers occupied 
by Italy, a constant target of his criticisms, 
belongs to Russia. Here, too, Ferdinand’s 
conservatism, in the tradition of the Holy 
Alliance of Metternich’s times, is a deci-
sive factor. Thus he manages to overcome 
his aversion to Prussia, understandable 
after the wounds Austria sustained at Sa-
dowa in 1866. This tri-imperial alliance 
he strives for would be a bulwark against 
nationalism, liberalism and socialism 
alike, products of modern political culture 
perceived as a counter to the monarchical 
principle of old Europe.  
*
Although the course Franz Ferdinand 
might have pursued had he acceded to 
the throne cannot be predicted with cer-
tainty, it seems reasonable to assume that 
he would not have put up with the exist-
ing situation in Austria-Hungary, i.e. with 
dualism. Unlike Franz Joseph, who ac-
cepts dualism as a political reality, Franz 
Ferdinand is a maximalist when it comes 
to Austrian interests. In the 1890s he 
thinks of reorganising the Monarchy ac-
cording to the principle of historic feder-
alism, with the nobility as its mainstay, as 
the central pillar of the monarchic order. 
In the early 1900s, however, this idea is 
abandoned and he, without ever revert-
ing to it, begins to contemplate a trialist 
arrangement, with Croatia, Slavonia (pre-
viously under Hungarian rule), Dalmatia 
and the Slovenian lands (previously under 
Vienna) forming a third unit, alongside 
Austria and Hungary. This suggests his 
special attention to the Croat factor, in-
spired not only by the Croats’ traditional 
loyalty to the Monarchy, but also by its po-
tential role as a counterbalance to Serbian 
national aspirations. Yet, as in the previ-
ous case, Franz Ferdinand does not stick 
to the idea for long. Disappointed by the 
resolutions of Rijeka (Fiume) and Zadar 
(Zara) of 1905 and the policy of Serbo-
Croat collaboration within the Monarchy, 
he abandons the trialist option. The cold 
reception he is given in Dubrovnik in 
September 1906, the Annexation Crisis in 
1908 and the Czech opposition to the tri-
alist arrangement involving South Slavs, 
make him turn in a different direction.
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Nor does he accept the Romanian 
politician Aurel Popovici’s proposal for 
the United States of Great Austria (Die 
Vereinigten Staaten von Grossösterre-
ich), published in 1906. Based on ethnic 
boundaries instead of dualism or historic 
federalism, this proposal envisaged fif-
teen member states under a strong cen-
tral authority but enjoying considerable 
autonomy: a central government headed 
by a chancellor, five common ministries 
(interior, foreign affairs, the army and the 
navy, finance, and Bosnia) and a bicameral 
parliament for the whole Empire. Franz 
Ferdinand rejects the proposal as unfea-
sible, and he also deems it unacceptable to 
dismantle the historic crown lands (Kron-
länder) by drawing ethnic borders. 
Finally, Bled discusses the so-called 
“Programm zum Thronwechsel”, drawn 
up by one of Franz Ferdinand’s aides in 
1911. The content of this programme of 
action after acceding to the throne sug-
gests that a possible direction would not 
have been the abolition of dualism but its 
reduction to an ordinary personal union. 
The Hungarian nobility would have been 
deprived of much of its prerogatives, and 
the introduction of universal suffrage in 
Hungary would have enabled non-Mag-
yar ethnic groups to secure majority in 
the Diet. Bled points out that Franz Fer-
dinand did not rule out the military oc-
cupation of Hungary in the event of her 
strong resistance to these changes, a move 
likely to plunge the country deeper into 
uncertainty. 
*
The last segment we shall dwell on con-
cerns Franz Ferdinand’s views on Aus-
tria-Hungary’s Balkan policy. Having 
lost her spheres of influence in German 
lands and Italy, Austria-Hungary turned 
to this part of Europe to reassert its status 
as a great power; although this was facili-
tated by the pulling out of the Ottoman 
Empire, Austria-Hungary had to take 
into account the independent national 
movements of the Balkan peoples as well 
as the presence of Russian interest in the 
Balkans. After 1903 Vienna was losing 
control of Serbia and after the annexa-
tion of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908 rela-
tions between the two countries became 
even more strained. Serbia’s active foreign 
policy, resistance of Bosnia and Herze-
govina’s majority, Serbian, population to 
Austro-Hungarian administration as well 
as the strengthening of the Yugoslav spirit 
among the South Slavs in the Monarchy 
were seen as a very serious threat in Vi-
enna.
Unlike Aehrenthal, Franz Ferdinand is 
not in favour of the annexation of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, even though he eventually 
accepts the new situation. He believes it 
to involve too great a risk of a larger-scale 
armed conflict and to inflict serious dam-
age to relations with Russia. This line of 
reasoning appears as a constant of Franz 
Ferdinand’s political logic, in which he 
resembles Franz Joseph. Unlike Conrad 
von Hötzendorf, chief of the general staff, 
with whom he had a complex relationship 
ranging from sympathy to confrontation, 
Franz Ferdinand is against a preventive 
war both against Serbia and against Italy. 
On the eve of the Balkan Wars (1912), he 
still advocates the policy of military non-
intervention in Balkan conflicts. A shift 
occurs after Serbia has scored quick victo-
ries, and in December 1912 he demands a 
military action against Serbia.    
In Bled’s view, however, the shift is 
short-lived and Franz Ferdinand soon re-
verts to his previous position. It is in that 
light that Bled looks at the famous meet-
ing between Franz Ferdinand and the 
German emperor Wilhelm II at Kono-
piste in mid-June 1914: its topic is Ro-
mania, while Serbia or a possible military 
action against her is not even mentioned. 
However, the report submitted on 24 June 
1914 by Franz von Matscheko reveals a 
plan of diplomatic measures calculated to 
Balcanica XLIV (2013)422
isolate Serbia: Austria-Hungary is sup-
posed to pursue the creation of a new 
Balkan alliance, with Romania, Bulgaria 
and Greece, which would be in the Cen-
tral Powers’ orbit and politically directed 
against the interests of Serbia and Russia. 
Bled does not think such a plan to have 
been feasible because of the conflicting 
interests of these countries.
In 1914 the political conflict between 
Austria-Hungary and Serbia is total; mili-
tary conflict is possible, but not inevitable. 
Things changed, Bled believes, with the 
assassination of Franz Ferdinand in Sa-
rajevo on 28 June 1914. Even though the 
assassination was undertaken by Young 
Bosnia’s national revolutionaries as an act 
of resistance to the occupation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, without official Serbia’s 
involvement, the strike at the dynasty was 
seen in Vienna as the strike at the very heart 
of the Monarchy and could not go unpun-
ished. Franz Joseph, consistently support-
ing a policy of peace until June 1914, now 
decides to declare war on Serbia. With the 
opposing blocs of powers joining in, the 
war takes on global proportions.    
*
Was Franz Ferdinand the “man who 
might have saved Austria”, as Carlo Sfor-
za believed in 1930? Bled does not go thus 
far. Moreover, his concluding discussion 
recognises the difficulties that Franz Fer-
dinand would have faced had he acceded 
to the throne. An autocrat disinclined 
to making compromises, a complex per-
sonality, disliked by the Hungarians, the 
Poles and the Czechs too, he would have 
met with strong opposition inside the 
Monarchy. Jean-Paul Bled’s biography of 
the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne 
gives a convincing and nuanced portrayal 
of the personal and political life of Franz 
Joseph’s ill-fated successor. With its fine 
balance between an individual life and the 
political climate in which it unfolded this 
book is also a worthwhile history of the 
Habsburg Monarchy in the last decades 
of its existence. 
Christopher Clark, tHe sleepwalkers – How europe went to war in 1914. 
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With the approach of the centenary of 
the outbreak of the First World War, the 
literature dealing with the greatest con-
flict the world had seen ever before grows 
rapidly. The book reviewed here is written 
by the Australian historian Christopher 
Clark, professor of German and mod-
ern European history at the University 
of Cambridge. His earlier books mainly 
deal with German history, and the two of 
them that stand out are a history of Prus-
sia: Iron Kingdom: The Rise and Downfall 
of Prussia, and a biography of the last 
German Emperor: Kaiser Wilhelm II: A 
Life in Power. 
Clark’s book on the origins of the 
First World War is based on ample 
source materials. Apart from the archives 
in London, Paris, Vienna and Berlin, he 
also used, with the help of assistants and 
translators, materials from archives and 
libraries in Sofia, Belgrade and Moscow. 
Clark’s interpretation of the origins of 
the Great War is predicated on two as-
sumptions which are implicitly threaded 
throughout the fifteen sections of the 
book, and which he struggles to prop us-
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